Do elected leaders in a limited democracy have real power? Evidence from rural China

Ren Mu () and Xiaobo Zhang

Journal of Development Economics, 2014, vol. 107, issue C, 17-27

Abstract: Do elected leaders in an authoritarian regime have any real power? Does grassroots democracy in a one-party state entail parochial problems? Making use of primary survey data covering two election cycles in a mountainous area of China, where an administrative village consists of several natural villages (NVs), we find that elected village heads favor their home NVs in resource allocations, especially when these NVs have a large population. In contrast, the home NVs of appointed Communist Party secretaries do not receive disproportionately more resources, on average. This pattern of resource allocation is compatible with the interest of village heads and suggests that as elected leaders, village heads have some true power in resource distribution.

Keywords: Allocations of public goods; Favoritism; Election; Appointed leader; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O12 P26 P36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:107:y:2014:i:c:p:17-27

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.10.009

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