Property rights and intra-household bargaining

Shing-Yi Wang

Journal of Development Economics, 2014, vol. 107, issue C, 192-201

Abstract: This paper examines whether an individual-level transfer of property rights increases the individual's bargaining power within the household. The question is analyzed in the context of a housing reform that occurred in China that gave existing tenants the opportunity to purchase the homes that they had been renting from their state employers. The rights to each housing unit were granted to a particular employee, so property rights were defined at the individual level rather than the household level. The results indicate that transferring ownership rights to men increased household consumption of some male-favored goods and women's time spent on chores. Transferring ownership rights to women decreased household consumption of some male-favored goods.

Keywords: Intra-household bargaining; Property rights; Housing reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Property Rights and Intra-Household Bargaining (2013)
Working Paper: Property Rights and Intra-Household Bargaining (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:107:y:2014:i:c:p:192-201

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.12.003

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