The determinants of bargaining power in an empirical model of transfers between adult children, parents, and in-laws for South Korea

John Ham and Heonjae Song

Journal of Development Economics, 2014, vol. 109, issue C, 73-86

Abstract: We derive a bargaining model of transfers between adult children and their parents, and then estimate the model using data from South Korea. Our analysis extends the literature on family bargaining by i) arguing that transfers from the couple represent semiprivate consumption (e.g. it is plausible that the wife cares more about her parents than about the husband's parents, and vice-versa) and ii) using results from laboratory experiments to help identify the model.

Keywords: Family transfers; Bargaining; Marriage market; Maximum likelihood estimation; Old-age support; Korea (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:109:y:2014:i:c:p:73-86

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.03.004

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