Are land reforms granting complete property rights politically risky? Electoral outcomes of Mexico's certification program

Alain de Janvry (), Marco Gonzalez-Navarro and Elisabeth Sadoulet ()

Journal of Development Economics, 2014, vol. 110, issue C, 216-225

Abstract: What is the impact on voting behavior of strengthening property rights over agricultural land? To answer this question, we use the 14-year nationwide rollout of Mexico's land certification program (Procede) and match affected communities (ejidos) before and after the change in property rights with voting outcomes in corresponding electoral sections across six federal election cycles. We find that, in accordance with the investor class theory, granting complete property rights induced a conservative shift toward the pro-market party equal to 6.8percent of its average share of votes over the period. This shift was strongest where vested interests created larger expected benefits from market-oriented policies as opposed to public-transfer policies. We also find that beneficiaries failed to reciprocate through votes for the benefactor party. We conclude that, in the Mexican experience, engaging in a land reform that strengthened individual property rights over agricultural land was politically advantageous for the right-wing party.

Keywords: Land reform; Property rights; Voting; Mexico (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 O13 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:110:y:2014:i:c:p:216-225

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.04.003

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