The relationship between federal budget amendments and local electoral power
Vladimir Ponczek and
Viviane Sanfelice ()
Journal of Development Economics, 2015, vol. 116, issue C, 186-198
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, we investigate whether politicians use resources from the federal budget to maintain and expand their political capital. Second, we examine whether such strategy is rewarded by voters. Do they vote for politicians who assist their municipalities through federal expenditures? We use data from legislative elections in Brazil, a country that does not use a single member district system to form its Chamber of Deputies. We use a regression discontinuity approach by exploring the results of close elections for the Chamber of Deputies. Our findings indicate that politicians tend to favor municipalities that were important to their elections and that voters support candidates who have brought resources to their localities.
Keywords: Voter's preference; Pork barrel; Politician's strategies; Electoral power; Regression discontinuity design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: The Relationship between Federal Budget Amendments and Local Electoral Power (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:116:y:2015:i:c:p:186-198
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