With a little help from my friends: Global electioneering and World Bank lending

Erasmus Kersting () and Christopher Kilby

Journal of Development Economics, 2016, vol. 121, issue C, 153-165

Abstract: This paper investigates how World Bank lending responds to upcoming elections in borrowing countries. We find that investment project loans disburse faster when countries are aligned with the United States in the UN. Moreover, disbursement accelerates in the run-up to competitive executive elections if the government is geopolitically aligned with the U.S. but decelerates if the government is not. These disbursement patterns are consistent with global electioneering that serves U.S. foreign policy interests but jeopardizes the development effectiveness of multilateral lending.

Keywords: World Bank; Political business cycle; Elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 F34 F35 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Working Paper: With a Little Help from My Friends: Global Electioneering and World Bank Lending (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:121:y:2016:i:c:p:153-165

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.03.010

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