Economics at your fingertips  

Ties that bind: Network redistributive pressure and economic decisions in village economies

Salvatore Di Falco, Francesco Feri, Paolo Pin () and Xavier Vollenweider

Journal of Development Economics, 2018, vol. 131, issue C, 123-131

Abstract: In this paper, we identify economic implications of the pressure to share resources within a social network. Through a set of field experiments in rural Tanzania we randomly increased the expected harvest of the treatment group by the assignment of an improved and much more productive variety of maize. We find that treated individuals reduced the interaction with their social network by discussing with fewer people in the village the type of seed they received, so as not to reveal their improved seed. We also find that treated individuals reduced labor input by asking fewer people in the village to work on their farm during the growing season and, as a result, obtained fewer actual harvest gains.

Keywords: Networks; Field experiment; Social norms; Redistributive pressure; Tanzania (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O12 O13 C93 H26 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Ties that Bind: Network Redistributive Pressure and Economic Decisions in Village Economies (2016) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Development Economics is currently edited by M. R. Rosenzweig

More articles in Journal of Development Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

Page updated 2019-10-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:131:y:2018:i:c:p:123-131