Land titles and violent conflict in rural Mexico

Paul Castañeda Dower and Tobias Pfutze

Journal of Development Economics, 2020, vol. 144, issue C

Abstract: Better enforcement of property rights reduces the incentives to engage in violent competition over resources. At the same time, greater tenure security may disrupt a key mechanism for political and social control, the discretionary allocation of land by local authorities, also potentially affecting the level of violence. We investigate the effect of a land certification program, which produced exogenous variation in tenure security, on violent deaths in Mexico's rural municipalities from 1993 to 2007. We find that land titles significantly decrease violent deaths on average. However, this reduction is present only in municipalities where the dominant political party has never lost an election. If all ejidos had been certified instantaneously in 1993, our estimates give a 12.8% reduction in homicides, pointing to a large social cost of having land as a political tool.

Keywords: Property rights; Violence; Land reform; Mexico; Ejido (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 O17 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:144:y:2020:i:c:s0304387818314974

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.102431

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