 Kompromat: A theory of blackmail as a system of governanceJames P. Choy Journal of Development Economics, 2020, vol. 147, issue C Abstract: Kompromat - widespread criminality combined with systematic blackmail - plays an important role in the governance of many non-democratic states. I model this phenomenon. Citizens have a preference for retribution, that is, for inflicting costly punishments on criminals. The state can manipulate this preference for its own benefit by tolerating crime while collecting evidence of crimes to use for blackmail. High levels of crime coexist with large expenditures on police. The rich but not the poor are allowed to commit crimes, increasing inequality. Kompromat regimes appear in states with low fiscal capacity and either very low or very high police capacity. When police capacity is high, investments in fiscal capacity and police capacity can be substitutes. States with initially similar capacities can diverge over time, and states that enter the kompromat regime can become stuck there. The possibility of kompromat qualifies previous claims that evolved retributive preferences increase material welfare. Keywords: Law enforcement; Corruption; Kleptocracy; Blackmail; State capacity; Retribution (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:147:y:2020:i:c:s0304387820301103 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102535 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Development Economics is currently edited by M. R. Rosenzweig More articles in Journal of Development Economics from Elsevier |
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