Religious leaders and rule of law
Sultan Mehmood and
Avner Seror
Journal of Development Economics, 2023, vol. 160, issue C
Abstract:
In this paper, we provide systematic evidence of how historical religious institutions affect the rule of law. In a difference-in-differences framework, we show that districts in Pakistan where the historical presence of religious institutions is higher, rule of law is worse. This deterioration is economically significant, persistent, and likely explained by religious leaders gaining political office. We explain these findings with a model where religious leaders leverage their high legitimacy to run for office and subvert the Courts. We test for and find no evidence supporting several competing explanations: the rise of secular wealthy landowners, dynastic political leaders and changes in voter attitudes are unable to account for the patterns in the data. Our estimates indicate that religious leaders expropriate rents through the legal system amounting to about 0.06 percent of GDP every year.
Keywords: Leaders; Religion; Rule of law; Dynasties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K10 K40 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Working Paper: Religious leaders and rule of law (2023) 
Working Paper: Religious Leaders and Rule Of Law (2021) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:160:y:2023:i:c:s030438782200116x
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.102974
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