Persuading voters to punish corrupt vote-buying candidates: Experimental evidence from a large-scale radio campaign in India

Laura Schechter and Srinivasan Vasudevan

Journal of Development Economics, 2023, vol. 160, issue C

Abstract: During the 2014 Indian general elections, we carried out a large-scale experiment randomizing a radio campaign highlighting the disadvantages of voting for corrupt vote-buying candidates. Official electoral data show that the radio campaign significantly decreased the vote share of parties that engaged in the most vote buying (as reported by journalists). Voter survey data show that the campaign increased the salience of corruption as an election issue and decreased voting for parties that offered gifts. From a policy perspective, we show that radio campaigns are a cost-effective method to influence voter behavior. From a measurement perspective, we show that journalist interviews can impartially identify vote-buying parties.

Keywords: Vote buying; Elections; Corruption; Radio; Mass media; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D83 K42 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:160:y:2023:i:c:s0304387822001183

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.102976

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