Sharing risk to avoid tragedy: Informal insurance and irrigation in village economies

Karol Mazur

Journal of Development Economics, 2023, vol. 161, issue C

Abstract: Irrigation provides insurance against aggregate weather shocks, which can interact with other institutions functioning in village communities. I study this relationship in a model of joint co-operation over irrigation and risk sharing under limited commitment. The model dynamics show that if access to irrigation can be regulated by villagers, the two institutions reinforce each other. However, non-excludable irrigation crowds out risk sharing (as is the case with government-managed irrigation). I estimate the framework on data from three villages in India and use it to quantify the relationship between informal insurance and irrigation, and the welfare impact of irrigation public policy.

Keywords: Endogenous aggregate risk; Informal institutions; Agriculture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E20 O11 O12 O13 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Sharing Risk to Avoid Tragedy: Informal Insurance and Irrigation in Village Economies (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:161:y:2023:i:c:s0304387822001729

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.103030

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