EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Policy enforcement in the presence of organized crime: Evidence from Rio de Janeiro

Alexsandros Cavgias, Raphael Bruce and Luis Meloni

Journal of Development Economics, 2023, vol. 162, issue C

Abstract: How does territorial control by organized crime groups affect the enforcement of public policies? We answer this question by studying the enforcement of social distancing policies in Rio de Janeiro during the COVID-19 crisis. Two criminal groups with distinct governance have de facto control over several areas of the city: drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and paramilitary groups (PGs). While the former funds itself mainly through the drug business, the second obtains most of its profits from extortion and illegal commerce of public services to citizens within their territories. This induces different responses to policies that reduce economic activity, such as those enacted in the pandemic. We document that in areas controlled by PGs, distancing was smaller than in government-ruled areas. On the other hand, DTOs’ turfs had similar social distancing to places controlled by the government.

Keywords: Organized crime; Policy enforcement; State capacity; COVID-19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I12 K42 O17 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387823000263
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Policy Enforcement in the Presence of Organized Crime: Evidence from Rio de Janeiro* (2022) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:162:y:2023:i:c:s0304387823000263

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103071

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Development Economics is currently edited by M. R. Rosenzweig

More articles in Journal of Development Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:162:y:2023:i:c:s0304387823000263