Loose knots: Strong versus weak commitments to save for education in Uganda

Dean Karlan and Leigh L. Linden

Journal of Development Economics, 2025, vol. 174, issue C

Abstract: Commitment devices offer an opportunity to restrict future choices. However, strict commitments may deter participation. Using a school-based commitment savings program for children to save for educational expenses in Uganda, we compare an account fully committed to school expenses to an account with a weaker commitment (funds withdrawn in cash, rather than a voucher). Children save more in the weaker commitment treatment arm, and when combined with parental outreach spend more on educational supplies and score 0.10 standard deviations (standard error = 0.04) on test scores. The fully committed account yields no such educational improvements, and neither account finds impacts on secondary or downstream outcomes such as attendance, enrollment, or non-cognitive skills.

Keywords: Commitment savings; Micro-savings; Educational resources; School participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D12 D91 I21 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:174:y:2025:i:c:s0304387824001937

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103444

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