Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties
Mehmet Bac and
Journal of Development Economics, 2006, vol. 81, issue 2, 478-499
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Working Paper: Beneficial Collusion in Corruption Control: The Case of Nonmonetary Penalties (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:81:y:2006:i:2:p:478-499
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