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Competition in bureaucracy and corruption

Mikhail Drugov ()

Journal of Development Economics, 2010, vol. 92, issue 2, 107-114

Abstract: This paper studies the consequences of introducing competition between bureaucrats. Firms are supposed to invest into eliminating negative externalities of production, while bureaucrats administer the process by issuing licences. Some bureaucrats are corrupt, that is, they issue a licence to any firm in exchange for a bribe. The competition regime is found to create more ex ante incentives for firms to invest, while the monopoly regime is better at implementing ex post allocation, that is, distributing the licences given the firms' investment decisions. Additional results on the effect of punishments and bureaucrats' rotation are provided.

Keywords: Corruption; Competition; Bureaucracy; Red; tape (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Competition in Bureaucracy and Corruption (2007) Downloads
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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:92:y:2010:i:2:p:107-114