Grain inflation: Identifying agent discretion in response to a conditional school nutrition program

Leigh Linden () and Gauri Shastry

Journal of Development Economics, 2012, vol. 99, issue 1, 128-138

Abstract: Many incentive programs rely on local agents with significant discretion to allocate benefits. We estimate the degree of discretion exercised by teachers within a conditional transfer program designed to improve nutrition and encourage student attendance in Mumbai, India. The program allocates grain to students every month their attendance exceeds 80%, creating an incentive for teachers to inflate attendance to benefit certain students. We find that teachers manipulate students' records, altering the incentives to attend school. The teachers' response also varies across students. Teachers inflate more for girls, better students, and students from lower castes, but less for Muslim students.

Keywords: School meals; Conditional transfer programs; Decentralization; Nutrition; Education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H I O (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:99:y:2012:i:1:p:128-138

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.11.002

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