Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs

Vianney Dequiedt (), A.-M. Geourjon and G. Rota-Graziosi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Grégoire ROTA GRAZIOSI

Journal of Development Economics, 2012, vol. 99, issue 2, 282-291

Abstract: Preshipment inspection (PSI) programmes are implemented in many developing countries to assist governments in the collection of revenue at their borders. These programs consist of the delegation of the inspection of imports to a private firm. To study these PSI programmes, we develop a hierarchical agency model in which the government authority can rely on two supervisors, namely the private inspection firm and the customs administration, to control importers' declarations. The government's optimal contract is fully characterized. We devote some attention to the inspection policy and its comparative statics properties. In particular, we identify the situations in which PSI programmes are revenue enhancing. We also discuss the reconciliation policy, i.e. what to do in case of conflicting inspection reports by the inspection firm and the customs administration. In the optimal mechanism, mutual supervision between the inspection firm and the customs administration is used to provide adequate incentives to all parties.

Keywords: Preshipment inspection; Mutual supervision; Corruption; Customs administration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 F13 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387812000090
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs (2012)
Working Paper: Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs (2011)
Working Paper: Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:99:y:2012:i:2:p:282-291

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.02.005

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Development Economics is currently edited by M. R. Rosenzweig

More articles in Journal of Development Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().