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The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk

Timm Marc Prein and Almuth Scholl

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2021, vol. 124, issue C

Abstract: This paper develops a stochastic dynamic politico-economic model of sovereign debt to analyze the impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk. We consider a small open economy in which the government has access to official loans conditional on the implementation of austerity policies. There is a two-party system in which both parties care about the population’s welfare but differ in an exogenous utility cost of default. Political turnover is the endogenous outcome of the individual voting behavior. In a quantitative application to the Greek economy, we find that bailouts amplify political turnover risk, which, in turn, elevates sovereign interest spreads. While stricter conditionality fosters the probability of political turnover and sovereign default in the short run, it may mitigate political turnover and default risk in the long run. The frequency of political turnover is U-shaped in the strength of conditionality.

Keywords: Sovereign default risk; Political turnover; Bailouts; Conditionality; Austerity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 E62 F34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: The Impact of Bailouts on Political Turnover and Sovereign Default Risk (2018) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:124:y:2021:i:c:s0165188920302335

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2020.104065

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Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok

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