Comments on: Mediation and strategic delay in bargaining and markets

Yizhou Xiao

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2022, vol. 141, issue C

Abstract: ‘‘Mediation and Strategic Delay in Bargaining and Markets” (BB) show that mediator proposals can accelerate trade and improve social welfare, even when the mediator is uninformative and makes random offers. This short comment notes that mediators may make non-random offers.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:141:y:2022:i:c:s0165188922000823

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104378

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