 An individual evolutionary learning model meets CournotJasmina Arifovic, Liang Diao and Nobuyuki Hanaki Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2025, vol. 172, issue C Abstract: We extend the individual evolutionary learning model by incorporating other-regarding considerations and apply the model to some Cournot games. Using a model fitted to the experimental data of a repeated three-player Cournot game (with non-linear cost and demand functions), we provide out-of-sample predictions regarding the “feedback effects” and “number effects” and test them using the data gathered via newly conducted experiments. The prediction regarding the feedback effect is partially confirmed. Namely, it is observed for the three- and four-player games, but not the two-player game. The prediction regarding the number effect is also partially confirmed in that while the model predicts the number effect to be observed with detailed feedback, and not under aggregate feedback, the effect is observed with both types of feedback. Keywords: Individual evolutionary learning; Oligopoly; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:172:y:2025:i:c:s0165188924001842 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2024.104992 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok More articles in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control from Elsevier |
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