Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics

Angelo Antoci, Antonio Gay, Massimiliano Landi and Pier Luigi Sacco

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2008, vol. 32, issue 12, 3877-3894

Abstract: We consider a deterministic evolutionary model where players form expectations about future play. Players are not fully rational and have expectations that change over time in response to current payoffs and feedback from the past. We provide a complete characterization of the qualitative dynamics so induced for a two strategy population game, and relate our findings to standard evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection when agents have rational forward looking expectations.

Keywords: Evolutionary; games; Dynamic; systems; Bounded; rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Global Analysis of an Expectations Augmented Evolutionary Dynamics (2007)
Working Paper: Global Analysis of an Expectations Augmented Evolutionary Dynamics (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:32:y:2008:i:12:p:3877-3894

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