Could myopic pricing be a strategic choice in marketing channels? A game theoretic analysis
Hassan Benchekroun (),
Guiomar Martin-Herran and
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2009, vol. 33, issue 9, 1699-1718
We identify the conditions under which a myopic pricing behavior could be a profit enhancing tool in the distribution channel. A channel member is myopic when he ignores the evolution of the retail prices when actual and past retail prices affect consumers' purchasing decisions. A differential game is formulated where channel members control transfer and retail prices. We start by examining a bilateral monopoly, and then introduce competition at the manufacturing level. The competing manufacturers play à la Nash and can be both myopic, both farsighted, or one myopic while the other is farsighted. We show that, for a bilateral monopoly, myopia enhances total channel profit when the effect of the reference price is small enough. This remains true under competition at the manufacturing level when products are differentiated enough.
Keywords: Marketing; channels; Pricing; Retailing; Myopia; Differential; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:33:y:2009:i:9:p:1699-1718
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