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Asset prices in an exchange economy when agents have heterogeneous homothetic recursive preferences and no risk free bond is available

Hervé Roche

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2011, vol. 35, issue 1, 80-96

Abstract: We study a pure exchange economy under incomplete markets where households have heterogeneous homothetic recursive preferences and lending and borrowing are precluded. We fully characterize the properties of the efficient allocations and the equilibrium asset price. The ownership distribution dynamics reveal the emergence of a dominant agent, who after some finite time, remains the only investor that increases asset holdings until asymptotically owning the entire wealth. Investors can be ranked according to a unique parameter that aggregates agents' preference characteristics and we show how time discount rate, attitude towards risk and intertemporal substitution contribute to capital accumulation.

Keywords: Recursive; preferences; Heterogeneous; agents; General; equilibrium; Ownership; distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok

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