An evolutionary analysis of turnout with conformist citizens

Massimiliano Landi and Mauro Sodini

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2012, vol. 36, issue 10, 1431-1447

Abstract: We propose an evolutionary analysis of a voting game where citizens have a preference for conformism that adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Multiple equilibria arise, and some generate high turnout. Simulations of best response dynamics show that high turnout is asymptotically stable if conformism matters but its likelihood depends on the reference group for conformism: high turnout is more likely when voters care about their own group's choice, as this better overrides the free rider problem of voting games. Comparative statics on the voting cost distribution, and the groups' composition are also done.

Keywords: Turnout; Coordination games; Poisson games; Conformism; Selection dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: An Evolutionary Analysis of Turnout With Conformist Citizens (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:36:y:2012:i:10:p:1431-1447

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2012.02.010

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