Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a Public Good game

Alexander Matros

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2012, vol. 36, issue 4, 642-656

Abstract: This paper analyzes an evolutionary version of the Public Good game in which boundedly rational agents can use imitation and best-reply decision rules. Several possibilities for both decision rules to be present in the population are considered. I show that altruistic behavior might survive if switching between the decision rules occurs less often than the probabilities of errors in choosing a strategy and if local neighborhoods are not too small or too large.

Keywords: Public good; Imitation; Best reply; Decision rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:36:y:2012:i:4:p:642-656

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2011.12.004

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