The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games

Michael Caputo and Chen Ling

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2013, vol. 37, issue 10, 1982-1994

Abstract: The comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria are derived for the ubiquitous class of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games. The resulting refutable implications are intrinsic to the said class of differential games, and thus form their basic, empirically testable, properties. Their relationship with extant results in the optimal control theory and the static game theory is discussed. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which the intrinsic comparative dynamics collapse, in form, to those in optimal control problems. Applications of the results to capital accumulation and sticky-price games are provided.

Keywords: Comparative dynamics; Differential games; Feedback Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Intrinsic Comparative Dynamics of Locally Differentiable Feedback Nash Equilibria of Autonomous and Exponentially Discounted Infinite Horizon Differential Games (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:37:y:2013:i:10:p:1982-1994

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2013.05.008

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