Search frictions, real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance

Julien Albertini and Xavier Fairise ()

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2013, vol. 37, issue 9, 1796-1813

Abstract: In this paper, we study the optimal unemployment benefits financing scheme when the economy is subject to labor market imperfections characterized by real wage rigidities and search frictions. The US unemployment insurance financing is such that firms are taxed proportionately to their layoffs to finance unemployment benefits. Using DSGE methodology, we investigate how policy instruments should interact with labor market imperfections. It is shown that wage rigidities in a search and matching environment cause welfare costs, especially in the absence of an incentive-based unemployment insurance. This cost is mainly due to the distorting effect of wage rigidities which generate inefficient separations. We show that the optimal unemployment benefits financing scheme – corresponding to the Ramsey policy – offsets labor market imperfections and allows implementation of the Pareto allocation. The second-best allocation brings the economy close to the Ramsey allocation. The implementation of the optimal policies clearly highlights the role of labor market institutions for short-run stabilization.

Keywords: DSGE models; Search and matching frictions; Layoff tax; Wage rigidities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E61 E65 J63 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188913000651
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Search frictions, real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance (2013)
Working Paper: Search frictions, real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance (2013)
Working Paper: Search frictions, real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:37:y:2013:i:9:p:1796-1813

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2013.03.010

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok

More articles in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().