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How important is fiscal policy cooperation in a currency union?

Eiji Okano ()

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2014, vol. 38, issue C, 266-286

Abstract: By constructing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, which assumes a currency union consisting of two countries with nontradables, we study the importance of fiscal policy cooperation. As shown in the previous studies, we find that the role of fiscal policy is important in maximizing social welfare. However, we have a contrary result for fiscal policy cooperation. While the previous studies highlight that fiscal policy cooperation has a nontrivial effect in maximizing social welfare, we show that fiscal policy cooperation has no benefits, regardless of the share of nontradables. Self-oriented fiscal policy can replicate social welfare under the cooperative setting.

Keywords: Currency union; DSGE; Policy cooperation; Optimal monetary policy; Monetary and fiscal policy mix (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E62 F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:38:y:2014:i:c:p:266-286

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2013.11.002

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Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok

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