Leave and let leave: A sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation

Luis Izquierdo, Segismundo Izquierdo () and Fernando Vega-Redondo

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2014, vol. 46, issue C, 91-113

Abstract: The option to leave your current partner in response to his behavior, also known as conditional dissociation, is a mechanism that has been shown to promote the emergence and stability of cooperation in many social interactions. This mechanism, nevertheless, has always been studied in combination with other factors that are known to support cooperation by themselves. In this paper, we isolate the effect of conditional dissociation on the evolution of cooperation and show that this mechanism is enough to sustain a significant level of cooperation if the expected lifetime of individuals is sufficiently long.

Keywords: Option to leave; Conditional dissociation; Prisoner׳s dilemma; Positive assortment; Exit option (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188914001456
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:46:y:2014:i:c:p:91-113

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2014.06.007

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok

More articles in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().