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Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia

Florin Bilbiie

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2014, vol. 48, issue C, 63-78

Abstract: In a forward-looking business cycle model, central banks can achieve the (timeless)optimal commitment equilibrium even in the absence of a commitment technology, if they are delegated with an objective function that is different from the societal one. The paper develops a general linear-quadratic method to solve for the optimal delegation parameters that generate the optimal amount of inertia in a Markov-perfect equilibrium, and studies the optimal design of some policy regimes that are nested within this framework: the (squared) optimal targeting rule; inflation, output-gap growth and nominal income growth targeting; and inflation and output-gap contracts.

Keywords: Discretion and commitment; Inertia; Optimal delegation; Stabilization bias; Timeless-optimal policy; Inflation, output gap growth and nominal income growth targeting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C73 E31 E52 E58 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia (2014)
Working Paper: Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia (2014)
Working Paper: Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia (2014)
Working Paper: Delegating Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia (2009) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:48:y:2014:i:c:p:63-78

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2014.08.019

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