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Federal reserve independence

Allan Meltzer

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2014, vol. 49, issue C, 160-163

Abstract: The Federal Reserve is always called an independent agency. The term “independent” is rarely defined. The only attempt in the literature and internal records is based on Chairman Martin’s statement that “the Federal Reserve is independent with the government, not independent of the government.” Martin explained several times that independence within government meant that the Federal Reserve helped to finance government budget because they were approved by Congress and signed by the president. Financing budget deficits is the very opposite of the principle adopted when Congress approved the Federal Reserve Act in 1913. In fact, the Federal Reserve has supported Treasury operations many times. I conclude that it is far more important to have an enforceable policy rule such as the Taylor rule, but any rule must have a provision that permits the rule to be set aside.

Keywords: E5; E6; Independence; Lender-of-last-resort; Monetary rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:49:y:2014:i:c:p:160-163

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2014.09.006

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Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok

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