Communication and transparency – The example of the ECB

Otmar Issing

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2014, vol. 49, issue C, 70-73

Abstract: Communication by central banks has two goals to fulfill: One is to be accountable and transparent to the public for its policy. The other is to make monetary policy by guiding expectations as effective as possible. Diversity of views inside the bank is instrumental for appropriate monetary policy decisions, but creates a tremendous challenge for communication. Central banks dispose of a variety of communication tools. Forward guidance seen as a revolution in central banks׳ communication raises new questions. Not maximum, but optimal transparency should be the final stage to strive for.

Keywords: Central banking; Communication; Transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188914002127
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:49:y:2014:i:c:p:70-73

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2014.08.023

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok

More articles in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().