Competition, work rules and productivity
Benjamin Bridgman ()
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2015, vol. 52, issue C, 136-149
I develop a theory to explain why workers want restrictive work rules, those that induce wages to be paid for non-productive labor hours, and why competition reduces them. Work rules allow workers to maintain both high levels of employment and wages. They generate a fixed payment that transfers the firm׳s surplus to workers, which wages alone cannot do, making them robust to alternative modeling assumptions. Competition loosens work rules by reducing the firm׳s surplus, which increases productivity.
Keywords: Competition; Productivity; Restrictive work rules; Labor unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 L11 O14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Competition, Work Rules and Productivity (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:52:y:2015:i:c:p:136-149
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