EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Lending terms and aggregate productivity

Nicolás Figueroa and Oksana Leukhina ()

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2015, vol. 59, issue C, 1-21

Abstract: Several empirical studies suggest that lending terms are eased in expansions and tightened in recessions, thereby influencing the mix of financed entrepreneurs. We study a model of adverse selection in competitive financial markets and show that lending terms deteriorate with the aggregate state under two general conditions. If exogenous increments to entrepreneurs׳ productivity raise returns to investment and/or tighten the credit line needed to screen out a given entrepreneur type, competition results in contracts with less screening. Two endogenous effects on productivity emerge. Production scales grow closer to optimal, but lower productivity entrepreneurs enter the mix of producers. The positive (negative) effect dominates at low (high) aggregate states.

Keywords: Lending terms; Credit market frictions; Competitive financial markets; Adverse selection; Productivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E22 E32 E44 G20 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188915001311
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:59:y:2015:i:c:p:1-21

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok

More articles in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

 
Page updated 2020-01-25
Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:59:y:2015:i:c:p:1-21