EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

How tournament incentives affect asset markets: A comparison between winner-take-all tournaments and elimination contests

Dawei Fang (), Martin Holmen, Daniel Kleinlercher and Michael Kirchler

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2017, vol. 75, issue C, 1-27

Abstract: We investigate the impact of investment managers׳ tournament incentives on investment strategies and market efficiency, distinguishing between winner-take-all tournaments (WTA), where a minority wins, and elimination contests (EC), where a majority wins. Theoretically, we show that investment managers play heterogeneous strategies in WTA and homogeneous strategies in EC, and markets are more prone to mispricing in WTA than in EC. Experimentally, we find that investment managers play more heterogeneous strategies in WTA than in EC, but this does not trigger significant differences in prices. Moreover, prices in WTA and EC do not differ significantly from markets composed of linearly incentivized subjects.

Keywords: Tournament incentives; Investment behavior; Market efficiency; Experimental finance; C91; C92; G02; G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188916301932
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:75:y:2017:i:c:p:1-27

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2016.11.006

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok

More articles in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().

 
Page updated 2020-08-06
Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:75:y:2017:i:c:p:1-27