 Pecuniary Disincentives in the Anti-Doping FightEconomic Analysis and Policy, 2009, vol. 39, issue 3, 349-351 Abstract: Most delinquent activities can generally be regarded as a choice made by an individual in the face of a number of legal and illegal alternatives for action, whereby the course of action chosen promises the greatest expected net utility for the individual at the time of the decision (Becker 1968). In the case of doping, the respective microeconomic calculation (Maennig 2002) makes it possible to simultaneously take into account a number of behavioural determinants such as additional sporting honours, additional income, moral qualms and short and long-term health risks. Theoretically in line with such microeconomic analysis, contributions from pedagogical and other disciplines often emphasise the role of ethical standards and moral suasion in fighting doping. In the last few decades economists have also put more weight on such ideas as it is “(good sporting) governance” which forms the climate within a sporting discipline and is certainly important in shaping the decision for or against doping. Keywords: doping; economics of sport; illegal activities (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v39:y:2009:i:3:p:349-351 Access Statistics for this article Economic Analysis and Policy is currently edited by Clevo Wilson More articles in Economic Analysis and Policy from Elsevier |
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