The Basic Economics of Match Fixing in Sport Tournaments

Raul Caruso (raul.caruso@unicatt.it)

Economic Analysis and Policy, 2009, vol. 39, issue 3, 355-377

Abstract: Match-fixing is a recurring phenomenon of sport contests. This paper presents a simple formal model in order to explain them. The intuition behind is that an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is the key factor leading to match-fixing or to tacit collusion. In particular, it will be demonstrated that an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake can lead to a concession from one agent to the other and then to a match-fixing. It is also demonstrated that when the asymmetry in the evaluation is extremely large there is room for tacit collusion. Eventually the intuitions and results of the model will be applied to make a comparison between the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA Champions League tournaments.

Keywords: Football, Sport Contest; Contest Management; Match-Fixing; Tacit Collusion; Asymmetry in evaluation; Concession; FIFA; UEFA; World Cup; Champions League (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D73 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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