Financial Restructuring and Credit Unions

Andrew Greinke
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Andrew Greinke: Australian National University

Economic Analysis and Policy, 1998, vol. 28, issue 1, 39-52

Abstract: The nature of credit unions as mutual financial institutions is examined and the economic implications of mutuality explored. While manager-shareholder agency costs are likely to be exacerbated within credit unions, shareholder-debtholder agency costs are likely to be eliminated. In this context, the implications for credit unions of the Campbell Report, the Financial Institutions scheme, and the Wallis Inquiry are discussed. While the imposition of risk-weighted capital adequacy requirements are inconsistent with the institutional form of credit unions, regulatory measures such as monitoring of management contracts can be supported.

Keywords: Credit; Financial Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:28:y:1998:i:1:p:39-52

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