Is bigger Better? Local Government Amalgamation and the South Australian Rising to the Challenge Inquiry
Brian Dollery (),
Joel Byrnes and
Lin Crase ()
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Joel Byrnes: School of Economics, University of New England, Armidale Australia
Economic Analysis and Policy, 2007, vol. 37, issue 1, 1-14
Abstract:
Although municipal amalgamation has enjoyed prominence as the primary engine of structural reform in Australian local government for at least the past century, mounting evidence concerning its adverse consequences has led to a growing scepticism over its efficacy as a suitable method of enhancing the operational efficiency of local councils. The results of an exhaustive enquiry into the financial sustainability of South Australian by the Financial Sustainability Review Board (2005) provides further damning evidence on the inability of amalgamation to improve the financial standing of fiscally distressed local authorities in that state. This paper examines those aspects of the deliberations of the Review Board that shed empirical light on the impact of amalgamation on the financial viability of South Australian local government and considers its wider implications for amalgamation as an efficacious instrument of municipal reform in Australia.
JEL-codes: H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:37:y:2007:i:1:p:1-14
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