Shared Equity Policy in Joint Ventures for Host Countries

Mei-Fang Chung ()
Additional contact information
Mei-Fang Chung: Department of International Trade, Kun Shan University, Taiwan

Economic Analysis and Policy, 2011, vol. 41, issue 2, 189-202

Abstract: This paper provides a game model for examining the host overseas investment policy and MNEs equity strategy in international joint ventures. This paper refines previous Chen & Chung’s (2008) results and considers the host policy about MNEs’ joint-venture. This paper shows foreign firms increase their technology transfer incentive because less competition from the joint-venture partner when a foreign firm holds lower shares. And the holding shares of foreign firms must be not smaller than 50 percent. The host welfare increases with foreign firms’ minority equity. The equity conflict exists in the higher technology spillover and transfer cost cases. Hence, the host governments always impose investment restrictions on MNEs in the Developing countries. Otherwise, it has more loose policy in the Developed countries.

Keywords: joint venture; equity policy; welfare; technology transfer; spillover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 M1 M21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0313592611500190
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:41:y:2011:i:2:p:189-202

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Analysis and Policy is currently edited by Clevo Wilson

More articles in Economic Analysis and Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().