Selection bias and moral hazard in the Australian private health insurance market: Evidence from the Queensland skin cancer database

Hong Son Nghiem and Nicholas Graves

Economic Analysis and Policy, 2019, vol. 64, issue C, 259-265

Abstract: This study estimates the effects of moral hazard and selection bias in private insurance by exploiting the unique characteristics of private health insurance in Australia using a longitudinal data of about 37,000 individuals. We estimate determinants of private health insurance status and health service consumption together as a system to control for individual unobserved effects. We also take into account the evolution of the health production process by controlling for the lagged dependent variables. We found that risk-averse individuals were more likely to purchase private health insurance, suggesting an advantageous selection. There is also evidence of ex-post moral hazard as privately insured individuals consumed more health services. Controlling for the lagged health service consumption reduces the magnitude of moral hazard considerably. The presence of advantageous selection and moral hazard in private health insurance indicates that the Australian healthcare system can be more efficient by increasing coverage and monitoring consumption.

Keywords: Moral hazard; Selection bias; Private health insurance; Qskin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:64:y:2019:i:c:p:259-265

DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2019.09.008

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