Does economic policy uncertainty influence executive compensation stickiness? Firm-level evidence from China

Qiaoyu Jia and Jia'nan Zhou

Economic Analysis and Policy, 2024, vol. 83, issue C, 562-582

Abstract: This study conducts an empirical analysis of the effect of economic policy uncertainty on executive compensation stickiness and the underlying mechanism using data on A-share main board listed companies from 2007 to 2021. This study finds that economic policy uncertainty positively relates to executive compensation stickiness. Tolerance, information, and supervision effects are important mechanisms of this impact. Further studies show that the effect of economic policy uncertainty on executive compensation stickiness is also significantly affected by political uncertainty, industry competition, nature of property rights, executive career concerns, and management power.

Keywords: Economic policy uncertain; Executive compensation stickiness; Information asymmetry; Management power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:83:y:2024:i:c:p:562-582

DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2024.07.006

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