Empowered minority shareholders and corporate cash dynamics: Empirical evidence from China's online voting reform

Shaojie Lai, Zixuan Luo, Qing Sophie Wang and Xiaoling Pu

Economic Analysis and Policy, 2024, vol. 84, issue C, 354-373

Abstract: This study examines whether enhanced minority shareholder voting influences corporate liquidity management. Using China's Rules for the Implementation of Online Voting (Rules) as a natural experiment, we find that increased minority shareholder participation leads to a significant reduction in corporate cash hoarding. By enabling their active participation, the Rules curtails tunneling activities, especially in firms with excess cash reserves, thereby mitigating expropriation by controlling shareholders. This effect is notably stronger in firms with weaker external monitoring mechanisms. Our findings also reveal that empowered minority shareholders contribute to more efficient cash allocation, reflected in higher market valuations of cash holdings and a quicker adjustment toward optimal cash levels. Overall, this study highlights the economic benefits of strengthened minority voting rights in mitigating agency problems and promoting value-enhancing liquidity management strategies.

Keywords: Minority shareholder; Cash; Online voting; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:84:y:2024:i:c:p:354-373

DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2024.09.009

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