 Does mandatory operating information disclosure affect corporate earnings management? Evidence from ChinaNa Li, Guifeng Shi, Ping Guo, Yanqin Wu and Weijia Zhuo Economic Analysis and Policy, 2025, vol. 85, issue C, 768-790 Abstract: Employing a staggered difference-in-differences methodology, this study examines how disclosing operational information influences corporate earnings management. The results reveal that the Chinese Industry Disclosure Guidelines (CIDGs) mitigate corporate earnings management. Mechanism analyses indicate that the CIDGs reduce earnings management by enhancing outsiders’ understanding of a company and improving information comparability across firms in an industry, thus limiting managers’ ability to engage in such practices. Heterogeneity analyses reveal that this effect is particularly pronounced among firms with lower information processing costs and higher industry competition. Disclosing more operating information further decreases corporate earnings management. Furthermore, no evidence was found supporting the notion that the CIDGs restrict firms’ real earnings management. This research extends the literature on mandatory nonfinancial information disclosure and corporate earnings management and has valuable implications for both regulators and managers. Keywords: Operating information; Earnings management; Industry disclosure guidelines (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:85:y:2025:i:c:p:768-790 DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2024.12.035 Access Statistics for this article Economic Analysis and Policy is currently edited by Clevo Wilson More articles in Economic Analysis and Policy from Elsevier |
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