Do local banks alleviate ownership discrimination? Evidence from China
Ceng Zeng,
Meng Guo and
Xiaoyang Zhao
Economic Analysis and Policy, 2025, vol. 87, issue C, 997-1013
Abstract:
Information asymmetry is more evident in the non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), than in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), due to the lack of government endorsement. Therefore, it is more difficult for the non-SOEs to obtain credit, creating ownership discrimination in the credit market. Our study investigates the role of local banks in alleviating ownership discrimination. We find that non-SOEs receive more credit compared to SOEs after the establishment of city commercial banks (CCBs) in China, indicating that CCB establishment alleviates the discrimination. Further, CCBs demonstrate information advantage in obtaining and utilizing soft information. Additionally, enterprises that receive more loans after CCB establishment are associated with better operational performance and lower financing costs, rejecting the alternative explanation that these banks allocate more credits to the non-SOEs by charging higher interest rates. Our study provides evidence of the crucial function played by local banks in the banking system.
Keywords: Local banks; City commercial banks; Ownership discrimination; Firm financing; Information asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:87:y:2025:i:c:p:997-1013
DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2025.06.041
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