Optimal insurance contract under VaR and CVaR constraints

Ching-Ping Wang and Hung-Hsi Huang

The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 2016, vol. 37, issue C, 110-127

Abstract: This study endogenously develops an optimal insurance contractual form for maximizing insured expected utility under VaR and CVaR constraints. We find that CVaR constraint does not affect the contractual form, but may increase minimum insurance premium requirement. Additionally, when the VaR constraint is binding, the optimal contract is a double deductible insurance. However, if the contract is restricted to a regular form (both indemnity schedule and retained loss schedule are continuously nondecreasing) for avoiding moral hazard problem, the optimal contract is a piecewise linear deductible insurance. Finally, we provide intuitive comparison between this study result and relevant studies.

Keywords: Optimal insurance; VaR; CVaR; Piecewise linear deductible insurance; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:37:y:2016:i:c:p:110-127

DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2016.03.007

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