Chilean pension fund managers and corporate governance: The impact on corporate debt

Mauricio Jara Bertin, Félix López-Iturriaga (), Pablo San Martin, Paolo Saona and Giannina Tenderini

The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 2019, vol. 48, issue C, 321-337

Abstract: In this paper we analyse the relationship between the investment of Pension Fund Managers (AFPs) and the cost of corporate debt (public and private). Using a sample of 93 non-financial Chilean listed firms between 2009 and 2014, we find that AFPs increase the probability of issuing bonds. Moreover, in line with our crowding out hypothesis, we show that AFPs increase the cost of bank borrowing. In line with the monitoring view, we find that AFPs decrease bond yields. On average, our results suggest that AFPs improve corporate governance by influencing information disclosure and by reducing the intensity of lending relationships with banks.

Keywords: Pension Fund Managers (AFP); Cost of debt; Corporate finance; Institutional investors; Corporate governance; Chile (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:48:y:2019:i:c:p:321-337

DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2019.02.012

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