Independent directors, CEO career concerns, and firm innovation: Evidence from China
The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 2019, vol. 50, issue C
This paper studies the impact of independent directors on corporate innovation activities. Based on patent data of Chinese listed firms during 2006–2017, I find that firms with more independent directors are better able to produce a higher level of innovation output. Consistent with the “career concerns” view, this positive effect is stronger in firms that face intense competition, are not state-owned, and have CEOs with short tenure. Overall, this study highlights the important monitoring role played by independent directors.
Keywords: Independent directors; CEO career concerns; Firm innovation; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:50:y:2019:i:c:s1062940818305813
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