Optimal reinsurance-investment game for two insurers with SAHARA utilities under correlated markets

Dengsheng Chen, Zhengyang Lu and Yong He

The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 2023, vol. 68, issue C

Abstract: In this paper, we study the optimal reinsurance-investment game between two insurers with the same insurance business but different wealth and risk preferences. Assume that the insurers who have the symmetric asymptotic hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (SAHARA) utilities and the price of risky asset obeys the constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model. It is impossible to obtain closed-form solution of the optimal reinsurance-investment strategy due to the non-homothetic property and the complicity of SAHARA utilities. According to establish a strong duality relationship of the value function, we successfully propose an efficient dual control Monte Carlo method for computing the Nash equilibrium strategies. Finally, numerical analysis is given to illustrate the impact of model parameters to Nash equilibrium strategies.

Keywords: Reinsurance-investment game; SAHARA utility; Nash equilibrium; Correlated markets; Dual methods; Monte Carlo simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C20 C61 G11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062940823000724
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:68:y:2023:i:c:s1062940823000724

DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2023.101949

Access Statistics for this article

The North American Journal of Economics and Finance is currently edited by Hamid Beladi

More articles in The North American Journal of Economics and Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().